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1 Introduction
Economists have been advocating tax systems, that assure decision neutrality, for quite
a long time. Well-known proposals are the “ACE/EXPEP”1 system (Wenger, 1983;
Boadway and Bruce, 1984; Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1991), the “Flat Tax” (Hall and
Rabushka, 1995), and the “Simple Tax” (Rose, 2002, 2005). Given the assumptions of the
famous Production Efficiency Theorem (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971), decision neutrality
is an important building block of welfare optima. Though these assumptions do not hold
in reality, Devereux and Sørensen (2005, p. 26) conclude that, due to political economy-
reasons and a lack of required information at the policy-makers side, “it seems preferable
to stick to the traditional goal of tax neutrality.” Sørensen (2007) discusses eight alter-
native proposals and concludes that the fundamental decision to make is whether the
“normal” return of capital should be taxed. However, representing rather comprehensive
and fundamental reforms, these proposals ignore the political economy aspects of tax re-
form. Politicians often do not believe in winning elections with these proposals on their
agenda – and thus these proposals fail to gain political support.
Especially a progressive income tax schedule with maximum rates well above the corpo-
rate tax rate seems to be “not negotiable”, because progressive income taxes provide a
broadly accepted instrument of redistribution. Varian (1980) already showed that in a
world with uncertainty the optimal tax may involve a progressive tariff,2 and in any case
1This is a combination of an Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) and Extended Personal Equity
Plans (EXPEP). The latter exempt the return from savings made out of taxed income from the personal
income tax base. The concept of notional interest deduction is based on the theoretical work of Wenger
(1983), Boadway and Bruce (1984), and Bond and Devereux (1995). As far as the profit tax base is
concerned, the term Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) is often used, as for the first time in Institute
for Fiscal Studies (1991). From 1994 to 2000, Croatia ran a purely consumption-based tax system with
an ACE profit tax (cf. Rose and Wiswesser, 1998; Keen and King, 2003). It has also been tested in
Brazil (Klemm, 2007). Recently, Belgium introduced a notional interest deduction at the corporate level
(Gerard, 2006). An overview of (partial) ACE systems in practice is given by Klemm (2007).
2Sinn (1990) discusses the problems of such an insurance argument in an Tiebout-like tax competition.
The powerful theorem of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) teaches us that a government should not levy capital
taxes in order to achieve equity but rather should make use of progressive labor income taxes.
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inequality can be harmful for growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini,
1994). Moreover, if multinationals can shift profits across borders via transfer pricing to
avoid taxes,3 capital taxes can be second-best (Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000). It follows
that tax reform efforts have to accept particular constraints in practise.
In a globalized world, tax reforms have to address the problems of international tax
competition (e.g. McLure, 1986; McGuire, 1986; Wildasin, 1986; Haufler and Schjelderup,
2000; Sørensen, 2007). A single country cannot afford rising the corporate tax rate too far
above international average.4 So the scope in which the change-over from status quo to an
improved tax system has to move in is small. In many countries, government’s response
has been decreasing corporate tax rates while broadening tax base (“Tax-Rate-Cut-cum-
Base-Broadening”).5 This may guarantee tax revenue in tax competition by small rates,
and provide a second-best level of public good supply (e.g. Haufler, 2001; Becker and
Fuest, 2009). The system of personal income taxation is left unchanged in large part.
In Switzerland and Germany interesting compromise proposals have been developed that
promise a higher level of decision neutrality without being obviously politically infeasible:
the Swiss ACE Dual Income Tax (SADIT)6 (Keuschnigg, 2004; Keuschnigg and Dietz,
2007) and the German Dual Income Tax (GDIT)7 (Sinn, 2003; Spengel and Wiegard,
2004; German Council of Economic Experts, 2006). We analyze the two proposals with
respect to decision neutrality and growth in a dynamic general equilibrium model. We
3See Hines and Rice (1994) for empirical evidence on transfer pricing activities of American multina-
tionals.
4Devereux et al. (2002) find that on average corporate tax rates have fallen across EU and G7 coun-
tries since the early 1980s. They argue that a fall in the cost of income shifting across countries and
international competition for profitable investment projects are two possible explanations. Similarly,
Weichenrieder (2005) provides evidence of on average declining corporate tax rates in 29 OECD and 45
non-OECD countries from 1985 to 2004.
5Sinn (1989) shows how a tax-rate-cut-cum-base-broadening policy can increase capital net outflows
when portfolio investment is the dominant element of international capital movements, using the example
of the U.S. tax reform in 1986.
6The authors label the proposal “Growth-Oriented Dual Income Tax”.
7The Dual Income Tax originates in the Nordic Dual Income Tax (Sørensen, 1994; Nielsen and
Sørensen, 1997; Cnossen, 2000).
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then consider a third alternative of reforming taxation, that guarantees an even higher
degree of decision neutrality, without necessarily jeopardizing political feasibility.
We provide an extended dynamic general equilibrium model and formulate a neoclassical
growth model with taxation in the tradition of Sinn (1987). Notwithstanding Sinn’s
approach we do not take Fisher’s separation theorem (Fisher, 1930) as a priori given;
hence, there is no well defined market value of a firm to maximize. Similar to Stiglitz
(1973) we thus directly maximize a representative household’s utility function subject to
the accumulation process.8 Moreover, we consider real as well as financial capital. The
reason for this approach is that Sinn’s approach applies net interest as discount rate,
which implies a tax system characterized by debt financing not to be inferior to any other
source of financing a firm’s investment. Our approach serves to question formally whether
this condition is satisfied. Furthermore, our approach enables us to distinguish between
two levels of personal capital income taxation: taxation at the time of realization and at
the time of consumptive usage. This is especially important when analyzing consumption-
based tax reform proposals, as the alternative reform we propose in this paper.
2 Basic Model
We consider an economy with competitive markets and identical infinitely living individ-
uals. The basic structure of the model is illustrated in figure 1.
Households For the sake of simplicity, the number of individuals at date t ≥ 0 is
constant over time, and the labor supply is fully inelastic and at each date given by
L. There is a representative household that earns labor income wL, where w denotes
the wage rate. The household owns the representative firm of the economy. Per capita
consumption is a flow c of units of a single good. The representative household evaluates
the flow of consumption it can enjoy after a certain point in time t in terms of the utility
8Cf. also the models by Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986). However, we do not have the restriction of
a finite planning horizon, as in Stiglitz (1973).
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function
U(t) =
∫
∞
t
e−ρ(υ−t) U [c(υ)] dυ (1)
U(c) is a twice differentiable, strictly concave and monotonically increasing function in-
dicating instantaneous felicity. Parameter ρ > 0 represents a subjective rate of discount.
The household’s stream of gross savings, labeled bQ, flows to an account at a representative
financial intermediary, also owned by the household. The household decides whether to
invest part of the resources held at the account into the firm via injections of new equity,
labeled bK , or to leave resources as a bank deposit. The stock of savings deposit, held at
the financial intermediary, is labeled Q. Financial assets bear interest at rate r, i.e. the
stock Q yields rQ. However, the household can also decide to withdraw resources from
the account for consumption purposes. The corresponding flow variable is denoted by aQ.
Firms The firm’s production of the single consumption good is assumed to depend on
the level of real capital K and labor L, according to a neoclassically well-behaved produc-
tion function f(K,L). We assume the Inada conditions to hold.9 Economic depreciation
of real capital is a fixed fraction δ > 0 of the stock K. The firm takes out loans of size d
from the financial intermediary, where d measures loans in terms of net values (new loans
minus repayments). For simplicity and in order to exclude tax relief for consumptive
usage, we assume that loans are solely used for investments. The outstanding stock of
debt we denote by D. As a third way of finance the firm can retain profits, denoted by p.
The amount of dividends distributed from the firm (in terms of real assets) to the bank
account is given as the residual aK :10
aK := f(K,L)− δK − wL− rD − p (2)
We assume that financial intermediation is costless and that the interest rate on loans
equals the rate on deposits. Hence, the financial intermediary does not make any profits.
9That is, limK→∞ fK(K,L) = limL→∞ fL(K,L) = 0 and limK→0 fK(K,L) = limL→0 fL(K,L) =∞.
10As usual we exclude debt financed dividends, because these are prohibited in most countries and
would cause excessive debt in the long run. We also abstain from new equity financed dividends, as
distributions beyond the amount of retained profits are usually treated tax-free.
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Consequently, consumption is financed by labor income and by withdrawals from the
account, aQ.
Before we continue some remarks on why we interpose a financial intermediary via an
account are apposite at this point: As consumption-based tax systems may distinguish
between distributed profits that are reinvested and those that are consumed, it is required
to interpose the bank account level, Q, because by doing so, we are able to distinguish three
levels of taxation: company taxation, capital income taxation at the time of realization,
and taxation at the time of consumption.
These preliminaries settled, the representative household maximizes (1) subject to three
equations of motion
K˙ = d+ bK + p, (3)
Q˙ = rQ+ bQ − aQ − bK + aK , (4)
D˙ = d, (5)
to the budgetary constraint of the household
wL+ aQ = c+ bQ (6)
and to the non-negativity conditions d, p, aK , aQ, bK , bQ ≥ 0. Equation (3) tells us that
net investments of the firm (into real capital K) can be financed either by debt d, by
inflows of new equity bK , or by retaining profits p. Following Sinn (1987) we assume that
economic depreciation δK is always financed via retained profits, that is, p represents a
net measure of investment: gross investment minus δK. Equation (4), in turn, tells us
that the stock of financial assets rises by accumulating interest earnings, by inflows of
new savings, bQ, or by distributed profits and withdrawn equity, aK , and is reduced by
withdrawn deposits used for consumption, aQ, or for investments in the firm’s equity, bK .
The budget constraint (6) tells us that labor income wL and withdrawn deposits aQ can
be used either for consumption c or for new deposits bQ. Net savings are given by bQ−aQ.
In order to be able to analyze taxation of consumption at the household level we consider
bQ and aQ separately, instead of using net savings. Finally, due to aK ≥ 0, we obtain via
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(2) the financial constraint that a firm cannot retain more profit for investment than it
generates: 0 ≤ p ≤ f(K,L)− δK − wL− rD.
2.1 Laissez-faire Optimum
The laissez-faire optimum is determined by utility maximization of the representative
household. After substituting for aK according to (2) and for c according to (6), the
resulting current-value Hamiltonian to maximize is given by:
H = U(wL+ aQ − bQ) + µK
(
d+ bK + p
)
+ µDd (7)
+µQ
[
rQ+ bQ − aQ − bK + f(K,L)− δK − wL− rD − p
]
+βKbK + γp+ αK [f(K,L)− δK − rD − wL− p] + σd+ αQaQ + βQbQ
To allow for boundary solutions involving the financial variables bK , p, d or aK being
equal to zero, we have to consider the more general first order Kuhn-Tucker conditions
x · ∂H
∂x1
= 0, referring these control variables’ Kuhn-Tucker multipliers x =∈ {αK , βK , γ, σ}
of the non-negativity constraints:
αKaK = βKbK = γ p = σd = 0. (8)
Using the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers we are able to apply the usual first order conditions
(FOC) ∂H
∂x
= 0 for all control variables x ∈ {aQ, bQ, bK , p, d}, and ∂H
∂X
= −µ˙X + ρµX for
state variables X ∈ {K,Q,D}. Hence we obtain:11
aQ : U ′(c) = µQ − αQ (9)
bQ : U ′(c) = µQ + βQ (10)
bK : µK = µQ − βK (11)
p : µK = µQ − γ + αK (12)
d : µK = −µD − σ (13)
K : −µ˙K + ρµK = (µQ + αK)(fK(K,L)− δ) (14)
Q : −µ˙Q + ρµQ = µQr (15)
11Note that because of using debt as negative stock the first order condition is −∂H
∂D
= −µ˙D + ρµD.
Moreover, if p equals the complete profits, this equivalent to aK = 0.
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D : −µ˙D + ρµD = −(µQ + αK)r (16)
The transversality conditions12, in turn, require
lim
t→∞
µQ(t)e−ρt = 0 (17)
From (9) and (10) it follows, that the shadow price of the bank account, µQ, is equal
to marginal utility U ′(c) in optimum, and that the shadow prices αQ and βQ must be
equal to zero in optimum.13 The other conditions inform us about optimal financing of
investment (conditions (11)-(13)) and optimal size of investment (conditions (14)-(16)).
2.2 Financial and Investment Neutrality
Static decision neutrality comprises, most of all, financial and investment neutrality. Dy-
namic decision neutrality, in turn, comprises intertemporal or growth neutrality and will
be investigated in Section 5.
Financial Neutrality In the case of positive net investments, K˙ > 0, the household
has to decide how to finance the firm’s investment optimally, given the three instruments
at hand: bk, p, d. Irrespective of the way of financing, the marginal utility of investing is
given by shadow price µK . Combining (11) and (12) it holds αK = γ − βK in optimum.
We obtain:
Lemma 1
If αK = γ − βK is an optimum condition, αK = 0 holds.
Proof: Given βK ≥ 0, αK > 0 is only possible if γ > 0, which corresponds with p = 0.
This, however, is inconsistent with αK > 0.
✷
12See (103) in the Appendix.
13Analyzing the last of our tax system alternatives, these Kuhn-Tucker multipliers will become crucial.
In all other reform proposals, however, it will always be the case that αQ and βQ must be equal to zero.
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We conclude that constraint p ≤ f(·) − δK − rD − wL is never binding for the firm:
αK = 0.14 Conditions (11) to (13) state that the respective marginal utility loss of
financing of each instrument must be equal to µK in an interior solution where all three
options are used. In this case, we obtain βK = γ = σ = 0. As long as the marginal
disutility of debt, µD, is lower than that of the two alternatives, µQ, despite optimal
investment is financed completely via debt (which corresponds with −µD = µK) it is
optimal to choose bK = p = 0, so that βK , σ > 0. Therefore, if a financing option involves
marginal cost higher than marginal benefit µK , this option is not used in optimum and
the corresponding respective shadow price – βK , γ, or σ – is strictly positive.
To conclude, for the household to be indifferent between the possible ways of financing
investment, it is necessary that βK = γ = σ = αK = 0 is in line with the FOC, so that
a solution bK > 0, p > 0 and d > 0 exists. Given indifference, this solution cannot be
unique, because any feasible combination of bk, p and d is optimal, including possible
(weak) corner solutions. This is illustrated by Figure 2 and explained in further detail in
Appendix B.
We thus obtain an analogon to the well-known neutrality result derived by Modigliani
and Miller (1958):
Proposition 1
In the laissez-faire optimum, i. e. without taxes, the household is indifferent referring the
way of financing investment, that is, βK = γ = σ = αK = 0 is in line with the FOC.
Proof: See appendix.
Our model implies a world without taxation, which is characterized by marginal cost of
financing being the same for all of the three instruments or, equivalently, by the indiffer-
ence of the household referring the way of financing investment. This situation without
14Marginal disutility of issuing new equity (bK) is loosing one unit at the bank account (µQ). Retaining
profit involves the same marginal cost, because losing one unit dividend reduces the balance by one unit,
too. Therefore, if the firm wants to retain more profit than earned, marginal investment can equivalently
be financed via issuing new equity, so that the marginal disutility of not being able to retain more profits
is zero: αK = 0.
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taxes serves as reference scenario.15 A tax system is then said to be neutral with respect
to the financial decision if the household is indifferent with respect to the combination of
the three ways of finance. We obtain:
Corollary 1
The criterion of financial neutrality is met if and only if for all t a solution exists with
βK = γ = σ = αK = 0.
Investment Neutrality The optimal size of investment is determined by conditions
(14)-(16). Because of µK = µQ = µD these conditions express the well-known result that,
in the optimum, the marginal return on investment equals the cost of capital, which is
equal to the market rate of interest:
fK(K,L)− δ = r (18)
From the household’s perspective, (18) states the no arbitrage condition that the yield of
the marginal investment into the firm’s stock of real capital equals the yield of lending to
the financial intermediary, r. Tax systems are neutral referring the investment decision if
this condition holds, which leads to:
Corollary 2
The criterion of investment neutrality is met if and only if equation (18) holds for all t.
From a normative perspective, neutrality can be considered as a necessary precondition
of production efficiency if the strong assumptions of the production efficiency theorem
hold (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971).16 Although these do not hold in practice, Devereux
15Already Modigliani and Miller (1958, p. 291-293) outlined that in real world – for instance, because
of manager preferences – the firm is not necessarily indifferent between the ways of financing even in a
world without taxation. Similarly our results basically only state that the way of financing is irrelevant
for the optimal investment decision. As in the literature on optimal taxation, we abstract from such
complications.
16To see this interpret different ways of financing a firm’s investment as different inputs into the
production function. As the theorem states, even in a second best scenario no discriminating taxes
should be levied on different input factors in order to prevent a distortion in the production process. Such
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and Sørensen (2005, p. 26) conclude that, due to political economy reasons and a lack
of required information at the policy-makers’ side, “it seems preferable to stick to the
traditional goal of tax neutrality.”
3 Basic Model with Taxation
We will now incorporate the major taxes on all different levels: the consumption level, the
level of bank deposit and the firm level. As we are interested in the economic efficiency
of different tax systems, we have to rule out income effects. Therefore, we have to close
the model and include the use of the tax revenue. As usual (for instance, Haufler and
Schjelderup, 2000), we assume that the tax revenue is rebated as lump-sum transfer to
the representative household and that the household does not anticipate that a higher tax
payment leads to higher transfers. Thus, from the household’s perspective, the lump-sum
transfers do not depend on any variable he has to determine, directly or indirectly. We
abstain from including the corresponding notation, for simplicity.
3.1 Taxation at the Personal Level
There are two possible levels of personal capital income taxation in the model. Capital
income taxation at the time of realization comprises a tax on interest earnings at rate τ r
and one on dividend payments at rate τa. Throughout the paper θi := (1 − τ i) is used
as tax factor, which corresponds to the tax rate τ i, i = {r, a, c, w}. The insertion of new
equity, bK , may be deductible from the tax base of the personal capital income tax. The
general model meets this possibility by factor θ˜a, which takes the value θa in the case of
deductibility, and one otherwise.
A tax on consumption, as the second possible level of personal capital income taxation,
is levied on withdrawals from the bank account for the purpose of consumption at rate
distortions may also occur in the case of a tax system lacking investment neutrality, as different industry
sectors may face unequal capital costs. Likewise, this can be interpreted as imposing discriminating taxes
on sector specific inputs.
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τ c.17 Labor income, in turn, is taxed at rate τw, which represents the marginal income
tax rate. The corresponding constraints (4) and (6) thus change to
Q˙ = θrrQ+ bQ − aQ − θ˜abK + θaaK (19)
θwwL+ θcaQ = c+ bQ (20)
3.2 Company Taxation
First of all a tax base has to be defined. To be able to model a broad set of company tax
regimes, two further parameters, α1 and α2, are introduced. The former is well-known
from Sinn (1987) and stands for accelerated tax depreciation, while the latter allows for
a full or partial deduction of equity costs. The general tax base reads as follows:
B := f(K,L)− wL− rD − δK − α1K˙ − α2r [(1− α1)K −D] (21)
All company tax regimes considered in this paper allow for a deduction of labor costs as
well as interest payments to the creditor. Depending on the details of the corresponding
tax law, the tax deductible write-off may lead to a higher present value than the true
economic depreciation of the capital stock, as given by δ. This difference is captured by
α1. Thus tax depreciation is modeled by continuous economic depreciation, δ, plus an
immediate write-off, α1. If the tax system allows for imputed costs of corporate equity,
the tax base is reduced by α2r per unit of equity [(1− α1)K −D].
Let the profit tax rate be denoted by τG. Note that our basic model is affected by company
taxation only in eq. (2), which now changes to:
aK = f(K,L)− δK − wL− rD − p− τGB
= θG [f(K,L)− δK − wL− rD]− p (22)
+τG
{
α1K˙ + α2r[(1− α1)K −D]
}
17Observe that this is not about a consumption tax in terms of a cash-flow tax, which would imply the
household’s stream of gross savings, bQ, to be allowed against (personal capital income) tax.
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As (3) stays unchanged, (22) can be expressed as:
aK = θG [f(K,L)− δK − wL− rD]− p (23)
+τG
{
α1(b
K + d+ p) + α2r[(1− α1)K −D]
}
3.3 Optimization in the Presence of Taxation
With taxation (2), (4) and (6) have to be replaced by (19), (20) and (23), respectively.
The extended Hamiltonian is given by:
H = U(θwwL+ θcaQ − bQ) (24)
+µK
(
d+ bK + p
)
+µQ
{
θ˜abK + θa
{
θG[f(K,L)− δK − wL− rD]− p
+ τG
[
α1(b
K + d+ p) + α2r[(1− α1)K −D]
]}}
+µDd+ αQaQ + βQbQ + βKbK + γp+ σd
+αK
{
θG[f(K,L)− δK − wL− rD]− p
+τG
{
α1(b
K + d+ p) + α2r[(1− α1)K −D]
}}
As first-order conditions we obtain:18
aQ : θcU ′(c) = µQ − αQ (25)
bQ : U ′(c) = µQ + βQ (26)
bK : µK = θ˜aµQ − βK − τGα1(θ
aµQ + αK) (27)
p : µK = θaµQ − γ + αK − τGα1(θ
aµQ + αK) (28)
d : µK = −µD − σ − τGα1(θ
aµQ + αK) (29)
K : −µ˙K + ρµK = (θaµQ + αK)[θG(fK(K,L)− δ) + τ
Gα2r(1− α1)] (30)
Q : −µ˙Q + ρµQ = µQθrr (31)
D : −µ˙D + ρµD = −(θaµQ + αK)[θG + τGα2]r (32)
The laissez-faire Kuhn-Tucker conditions given in (8) remain valid. These formulas serve
as tools for the following analysis of different tax reform proposals. They are not in-
18The transversality condition (17) must hold in an optimum as well.
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terpreted here in this general form. Nevertheless one observation should be mentioned,
namely that the deviation of tax depreciation from economic depreciation affects all three
financial instruments of the firm (bK , p and d) in exactly the same way. This can be seen
from the last summand in (27), (28) and (29), respectively. That is, if a tax system lacks
financial neutrality, this is not due to its particular rules of tax write-off. In fact, such an
a-neutrality is due to an inappropriate choice of tax rates.
3.4 Some Methodological Remarks
In our approach we do not assume Fisher’s Separation Theorem (Fisher, 1930) to hold
a priori. This theorem states that utility maximization implies the maximization of the
representative firm’s market value. Thereby the market value is determined by the present
value of all future cash flows net of tax between the firm and its shareholders. To calculate
the present value, the interest rate net of tax is employed as discount rate.
The economic reasoning underlying this approach is that the market value quotes how
much capital would have to be alternatively deposited today in a bank account, yield-
ing interest income, in order to generate the same future net cash flows. However, this
premises that the alleged alternative investment in financial assets actually is a good alter-
native, assuming rational behavior of the investor. Suppose, for example, the corporate
tax rate falls short of the personal tax rate levied on interest income. To keep things
simple there be no further taxes on dividends and capital gains. In such a scenario, it
would be rational to invest as much real capital until the difference between its marginal
product and the pre-tax interest rate exactly compensates the tax wedge. But if we allow
for granting loans at the company level, the marginal gross product of an investment into
the firm will never fall short of the pre-tax interest rate. In such a case the investor is
capable of a better alternative than a bank deposit on his private account. Thus, in such
a case it can hardly be justified to employ the interest rate net of personal tax as the
right discount rate to determine the market value (Siemers and Zo¨ller, 2006).
In our general model we exclude granting loans at the company level, as we require d ≥ 0.
In equilibrium, it must hold that Q = D. Dropping restriction d ≥ 0 would result in the
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firm to become a net supplier of debt capital. In market equilibrium, this would imply
the household to borrow from the firm. In the simple example from above this would
imply that the tax system allows for tax deduction of interest payed on private credits at
a higher rate than the firm has to tax its yields. This implies arbitrage for every positive
interest rate and no finite equilibrium D = Q will exist. In such a case, d ≥ 0 generates
a “synthetic” equilibrium D = Q = 0 if we assume D = 0 as initial value. We do not try
to interpret this case, which would degenerate our model in large parts. We rather use
the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker multiplier σ to question whether a capital market with a
well defined interest rate r exists.
Summing up, if σ = 0 is in line with the first-order conditions, the non-negativity con-
straint d ≥ 0 is not binding. In this case a capital market exists when we close the model.
To deposit capital in a bank account yielding net interest is a possible alternative to an
investment into the firm, restricting the net return of the latter not to fall below the net
interest rate. Thus net interest serves as discount rate to determine the firm’s market
value. On the other hand, σ > 0 indicates that there exists no capital market in the
closed model. In such a case we are not able to define a market value of the firm.
Our approach allows for a third level of taxation, namely to tax withdrawals from bank
accounts which are used for consumption. It enables us to analyze the financial decision
of a firm in a tax system applying this level of taxation. Furthermore, if it turns out that
σ = 0 holds in such a tax system, we can find a well defined discount rate and, thus,
the market value of the firm. Therefore, by applying the utility approach instead of the
market value approach we verify the applicability of Fisher’s Separation Theorem in our
extended setting.
4 Analysis of Different Tax Systems
Since capital is more mobile than the input factor labor, taxation of capital involves
stronger allocation distortions and higher revenue losses than wage taxes. Hence, several
reform proposals of the last few years combine a moderate level of capital income and
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corporate taxes, with maintaining the existing (highly) progressive income tax on wages
(e.g. Haufler, 2001). In this section, we analyze three proposals of that kind.
4.1 The Swiss ACE Dual Income Tax
The Swiss ACE Dual Income Tax (SADIT) has been proposed by Christian Keuschnigg in
2004.19 The profit tax allows for a notional interest on a company’s equity. The notional
interest rate matches the “normal return” in the amount of the market interest rate r.
In contrast to a pure consumption-based tax system, the Allowance for Corporate Equity
(ACE) is combined with a personal tax on capital income, which comprises returns on
interest, dividend payments and capital gains. Interest yields are taxed at the constant
rate τ r, while dividends and capital gains are taxed at a dynamic rate τa, in order to
compensate for the tax free accumulation of normal returns in the firm. The latter
increases in time t, beginning at the time of share purchase t1:
τa ≡ 1− e−τ
rr(t−t1) (33)
The tax base is the dividend payment or the realization receipts, respectively. Observe
that, in the latter case, purchase costs are not deductible. Assuming efficient capital
markets, Auerbach and Bradford (2004) show this tax formula to be equivalent to a
cash-flow tax at rate
τa = 1− e−τ
rr(t−t) (34)
with t representing a particular calendar date, which is not associated with the date of
purchase. It rather applies to all dividends and realization receipts, independent of the
underlying share’s purchase date. As is inherent to a cash-flow tax, the share purchase at
date t1 provides a deduction at rate τ
a = 1 − e−τ
rrt1 . The same is true for the injection
of new equity into the firm. Without affecting the functioning of the dynamic tax rate,
namely the compensation for the tax free accumulation of normal returns in the firm, the
starting point t can be set to zero.
19Cf. Keuschnigg (2004) and Keuschnigg and Dietz (2007).
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In our model, we use the second variant of the dynamic tax rate, that is, the cash-flow
version. As this implies a deduction of new equity, bK , from the capital income tax base
at the time of insertion, we have to set θ˜a = θa. We account for the ACE system on the
company level by setting α2 = 1. The conclusions derived from the first-order conditions
in the general model reduce to:
aQ : U ′(c) = µQ − αQ (35)
bQ : U ′(c) = µQ + βQ (36)
bK : µK = θaµQ − βK − τGα1(θ
aµQ + αK) (37)
p : µK = θaµQ − γ + αK − τGα1(θ
aµQ + αK) (38)
d : µK = −µD − σ − τGα1(θ
aµQ + αK) (39)
K : −µ˙K + ρµK = (θaµQ + αK)[θG(fK(K,L)− δ) + τ
Gr(1− α1)] (40)
Q : −µ˙Q + ρµQ = µQθrr (41)
D : −µ˙D + ρµD = −(θaµQ + αK)r (42)
We find:
Proposition 2
The SADIT establishes financial neutrality.
Proof: See appendix.
To get the economic intuition of the result we pick up the interpretation of shadow prices.
A once and for all reduction of one unit of outstanding debt reduces interest payments
from that time. Ceteris paribus, this leads to a permanent increase in dividend payments,
which are given as a residual according to (23), in the amount of r. In contrast to the
tax free world, only the amount net of dividend tax reaches the bank account, i.e. θar.
Remember that θa decreases monotonically as time elapses, starting at one in t = 0 and
converging to zero as time goes to infinity. A once and for all increase in Q, on the other
hand, leads to a permanent increase in interest yields, which are taxed at the time they
accrue at rate τ r. As the interest tax rate is constant over time, the dividend tax rate falls
short of it in a first period of time and exceeds it afterwards. For given before-tax cash
flows this implies a higher net income during this first period in the case of dividends.
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This tax induced surplus augments the bank account and yields interest income. By
construction the increase in the dividend tax rate exactly offsets this advantage. Starting
at t = 0, which implies a dividend tax rate of zero, the shadow prices under consideration,
−µD and µQ, are equal. At every later point in time the dividend tax rate drives a wedge
between them. This is due to the fact, that the reduction in the stock of debt is assumed to
be exogenous, to be in line with the interpretation of shadow prices, rather than preceded
by a tax deductible insertion of equity. It thus bears the very tax burden accrued from
t = 0 until that time as retained profits. But observe that this is only a level effect and
constitutes no incentives for further retaining profits or substituting equity for debt.
To see this algebraically take a look at the present value of the tax induced difference in
the net income at time t. As discount rate we use the interest rate net of tax, which is
justified as γ = 0 is in line with the first-order conditions. The present value at time t
reads as: ∫
∞
t
r(θr − θa)e−θ
rr(v−t)dv (43)
Inserting the formula of the dynamic dividend tax rate according to (34) we receive:
∫
∞
t
r(θr − e−τ
rrv)e−θ
rr(v−t)dv =
∫
∞
t
θrre−θ
rr(v−t)dv − e−τ
rt
∫
∞
t
re−r(v−t)dv = τa (44)
As claimed above the present value of the tax induced difference in interest and dividend
income, given equal before-tax cash flows, is determined by the dividend tax rate at the
time of the respective exogenous once and for all changes in debt and bank deposits. As
a special case the tax rate and thus the difference in net income vanishes if t = 0.
Next we control for investment neutrality and ask how much is optimally invested, given
the gross interest rate r. We obtain:
Proposition 3
The SADIT establishes investment neutrality.
Proof: See appendix.
That is, the optimal investment of the firm is the same as without taxation, so that the
tax system does not distort the investment decision of the firm. As this is true for any α1,
this result does not rely on any specific tax write-off. To put it differently, the depreciation
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rules of the tax code do not affect the pre-tax return of the marginal investment and thus
the optimally chosen capital stock, given r. This is a well known result of a pure ACE tax
system and, as has just been shown, stays true for the combined tax system of the SADIT.
To sum up, the SADIT neither distorts the financial nor the investment decision of the
firm. Whether the intertemporal allocation is affected, we will investigate in Section 5.
4.2 The German Dual Income Tax
In 2006, the German Council of Economic Experts proposed a Dual Income Tax for
Germany (German Council of Economic Experts, 2006) that was similar to the Norwegian
Dual Income Tax Reform in 2002.20 The German Dual Income Tax (GDIT) formally treats
corporations and non-incorporated firms differently.
4.2.1 GDIT and Corporations
The council proposes to tax all kinds of capital income – for instance, dividends, capital
gains and interest yields – at a rate which significantly falls short of the maximum rate
levied on labor income. The main difference to the current German tax system is an
indexing of an asset’s purchase price or the amount inserted as new equity into a firm at
the personal income tax level. The indexing rate equals the market rate of interest net
of tax. Thus dividends and capital gains are effectively not taxed until this imputation
capacity is exhausted.
We again confine to insertions of new equity and receipts of dividends. Assume an in-
sertion at time t1 which gives rise to a dividend payment at t2 that is high enough to
exhaust the imputation induced by the insertion. An insertion of bK in t1 leads to an
amount of [τabKeθ
rr(t2−t1)], which can be offset against the dividend tax in t2. If we use
net interest21 as discount rate, an assumption to be justified later on, the present value
20Cf. Sørensen (2005).
21For the sake of simplicity we hold r constant. Nothing essential hinges on this assumption.
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of this imputation at any point in time t is given by
τabKeθ
rr(t2−t1)e−θ
rr(t2−t) = τabKeθ
rr(t−t1) (45)
As (45) reveals, the present value of an insertion’s imputation capacity is independent of
the particular date it is offset against dividend tax. Apart from its reference date t, it
solely depends on the time of insertion. Thus the present value of an imputation capacity
induced by an insertion bK and valued at the time of insertion is just τabK , irrespective of
the time it is actually offset.22 It should be clear that in present value terms it would be
equivalent to induce a cash flow tax comprising an asset’s purchase price and insertions
on the one hand as well as realization receipts and dividends on the other hand, rather
than to index an asset’s purchase price and insertions of new equity until they can be
offset against realization receipts or dividends.23 We employ this equivalence by setting
θ˜a = θa.
Furthermore the GDIT for corporations can be represented by setting the following tax
parameters. The interest tax rate equals the dividend tax rate and also meets the corpo-
rate tax rate, τ r = τa = τG. In order to see how essential this equality is, we start our
analysis with a separate parameter for each tax and equalize them after the optimiza-
tion. As has just been argued, the future imputation induced by an insertion bK has a
present value of τabK at the time of insertion (θ˜a = θa). On the company level there is
no allowance for corporate equity, thus α2 = 0.
22The assumption that the imputation capacity is exhausted by one dividend payment at one point
in time (t2), is not restrictive, as we could split the insertion and assign each fraction to an adequate
dividend payment at different points in time.
23The equivalence is completely in line with the findings of Sørensen (2005), who analyzes the Share-
holder Income Tax as the respective part of the Norwegian Dual Income Tax.
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The first-order conditions of the general model now yield:
aQ : U ′(c) = µQ − αQ (46)
bQ : U ′(c) = µQ + βQ (47)
bK : µK = θaµQ − βK − τGα1(θ
aµQ + αK) (48)
p : µK = θaµQ − γ + αK − τGα1(θ
aµQ + αK) (49)
d : µK = −µD − σ − τGα1(θ
aµQ + αK) (50)
K : −µ˙K + ρµK = (θaµQ + αK)
{
θG [fK(K,L)− δ]
}
(51)
Q : −µ˙Q + ρµQ = µQθrr (52)
D : −µ˙D + ρµD = −(θaµQ + αK)θGr (53)
We obtain:
Proposition 4
The GDIT establishes financial neutrality for corporations.
Proof: See appendix.
Analyzing the investment decision of the firm, given r, we obtain:
Proposition 5
The GDIT does not establish investment neutrality for corporations, unless α1 = 0.
Proof: See appendix.
That is, only in the special case of true economic depreciation (α1 = 0) investment
neutrality prevails, which is the well-known Johansson-Samuelson Theorem (Samuelson,
1964; Johansson, 1969).
4.2.2 GDIT and Non-Corporate Firms
As already mentioned the GDIT taxes non-corporate firms quite differently. But, as will
be shown, the two ways yield equivalent economic results: τ r stays unchanged, there is
no tax on the withdrawals from the firm, τanon−corporate = 0, and the firm’s return is taxed
at the progressive personal tax rate τ p, i. e. τGnon−corporate = τ
p. The tax rates are chosen
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such that θp = θGθa holds at the top level of the progressive tariff. At the firm level there
is a partial allowance for equity capital. As in an ACE system, the stock of equity net of
tax write-offs is the relevant quantity. In contrast to a pure ACE the tax rate levied on
the imputed interest on equity at the firm level, however, is not zero, but matches the tax
rate on interest income τ r. We translate this partial allowance into the model by setting
α2 = (τ
G − τ r)/τG (54)
Observe that, as the tax base is reduced by α2r per unit of tax-written down equity
capital, this choice of α2 implies a tax levied on a normal return r given by
τG(1− α2)r = τ
rr, (55)
which justifies the choice of α2. We obtain:
Proposition 6
The GDIT establishes financial neutrality for non-corporated firms.
Proof: See appendix.
To analyze the investment decision of the firm we apply (30) using the respective param-
eters for the non-corporate case of the GDIT.
Proposition 7
The GDIT does not establish investment neutrality for non-corporate firms, unless α1 = 0.
Proof: See appendix.
Summing up, though the GDIT treats corporations and non-corporate firms quite differ-
ently in a formal sense, the economic impact of the two variants is equivalent as far as
the financial decision and the marginal investment is concerned. If we assume τ p to be
at the top level of the progressive tariff and remember that τa and τGcorporate are chosen
such that θp = θGcorporateθ
a holds, even super-normal profits are taxed equally, measured
in present values.
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4.3 An Alternative ACE Proposal
We now consider an alternative that consists of an ACE at the company level combined
with a modified capital income tax at the personal level, which leaves capital income
untaxed until it is withdrawn for the purpose of consumption.24 While ACE components
are well known, the implementation of a usage-dependent capital income taxation requires
some explanation.
Our basic model in particular fits for this third proposal (cf. Figure 1): A crucial element
of the proposal is the introduction of so called “Qualified Bank Accounts” (QBA).25 A
QBA comprises a savings account as well as a custody account as sub-accounts. For
the sake of simplicity assume that every financial transaction made by an individual,
in particular the insertion of new equity into the firm, is processed using such a QBA.
Furthermore every share be hold within the custody sub-account, which ensures dividends
to flow into the QBA when distributed. In principle there are four possible inflows to the
QBK: new savings, dividends distributed by the firm, capital gains from share transfers
and interest on the current stock of savings. None of these inflows is subject to capital
income taxation.
New savings are not tax deductible, which would be the case in an S-base cash-flow
tax. Possible outflows are insertions of new equity into the firm and withdrawals for
consumption. Only the latter is subject to capital income taxation. Thus there is an
asymmetry between taxable withdrawals and non-deductible new savings.
As the QBA implies zero taxes levied on interest income accumulated within the account
and dividends payed into the account, the corresponding tax parameters in the model
vanish, that is, τ r = τa = 0. Withdrawals from the QBA are taxed at τ c > 0. On the
24See Heidelberger Steuerkreis and RWI Essen (2006) for the basics of the proposal. Siemers and Zo¨ller
(2006) further describe the proposal and analyze its neutrality properties in a two-period setting.
25In the remainder of the paper we refer to the Heidelberg-RWI proposal as ACE/QBA system. The
basic concept of the ACE/QBA system were developed by Manfred Rose, Marco Scholz and Daniel Zo¨ller
at the University of Heidelberg. Since 2006 the RWI joins this team. The tax law provisions necessary
to introduce the ACE/QBA system in Germany have been developed, too.
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company level the ACE implies α2 = 1. The conclusions derived from the first-order
conditions in the general model with taxation now reduce to:
aQ : θcU ′(c) = µQ − αQ (56)
bQ : U ′(c) = µQ + βQ (57)
bK : µK = µQ − βK − τGα1(µ
Q + αK) (58)
p : µK = µQ − γ + αK − τGα1(µ
Q + αK) (59)
d : µK = −µD − σ − τGα1(µ
Q + αK) (60)
K : −µ˙K + ρµK = (µQ + αK)[θG(fK(K,L)− δ) + τ
Gr(1− α1)] (61)
Q : −µ˙Q + ρµQ = µQr (62)
D : −µ˙D + ρµD = −(µQ + αK)r (63)
We obtain:
Proposition 8
The ACE/QBA system establishes financial and investment neutrality.
Proof: See appendix.
Its again noteworthy that investment neutrality holds in this system independent of the
depreciation parameter α1. Overall, combining an ACE at the company level with a QBA
preserves the well-known intra-temporal neutrality results of a pure consumption-based
tax system. It neither distorts the investment and financial decision of a firm, nor does
the investment decision depend on the tangible depreciation rules given by tax law.
As far as static efficiency is concerned, the ACE/QBA system does not qualitatively
differ from the SADIT. However, it is attained in quite different ways. The SADIT
basically adheres to taxing capital income, in particular interest yields, when it accrues.
It counterbalances the relative advantage of an ACE tax base, namely to accumulate
normal returns tax free on the company level, by adequately increasing the tax rate
levied on dividends and capital gains. The ACE/QBA system, in contrast, countervails
the relative disadvantage of taxing interest yields, compared to an ACE tax base on the
company level. Thus a Qualified Bank Account is primarily employed in order to leave
interest yields tax exempt as long as they are accumulated, just as normal returns on
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assets at the company level are treated given an ACE tax base. Moreover, QBAs also
prevent lock-in effects, which would arise if the reallocation of capital from one firm to
another would inevitably be charged with a tax. In contrast, under GDIT and SADIT the
reallocation of capital triggers capital income taxation on the amount not yet subject to
personal income taxation. The SADIT prevents lock-in effects by resetting the dynamic
tax rate to zero (τa = 0). In the case of the GDIT the base for indexing the purchase
costs of the new shares is increased by the taxed amount.
However, the decisive advantage of the alternative is located at its dynamic characteristics,
which brings us to the issue of intertemporal or growth neutrality, that is, the effects on
the capital accumulation process and thus on economic growth. For this issue it will
turn out that the first two FOC of the new ACE/QBA proposal are decisive. From (56)
and (57) we conclude that the tax on withdrawals from the bank account, τ c, potentially
drives a wedge between the shadow price of bank deposits, µQ, and the marginal utility
of consumption, U ′(c), depending on the value of βQ. We obtain:
αQ + βQ = τ cU ′(c) (64)
There are three possible scenarios that fulfill this condition: (i) αQ > 0 and βQ = 0; (ii)
αQ, βQ > 0; and (iii) αQ = 0 and βQ > 0. Given the slack conditions αQaQ = 0 and
βQbQ = 0, this corresponds with (i) savings, but no withdrawals from the QBA: aQ = 0
and bQ ≥ 0; (ii) no savings and no withdrawals: aQ = bQ = 0; and (iii) no savings, but
withdrawals from the QBA: aQ ≥ 0, but bQ = 0. Hence, in case (i) there is no wedge
between µQ and U ′(c), because βQ = 0. Note that at every point in time there are either
no insertions or no withdrawals from the bank account. However, it might be in line with
utility maximization that there are neither insertions nor withdrawals at the same time
(especially case (ii)).
It follows that three distinct phases are possible: one of insertion of new savings (phase I:
bQ ≥ 0, βQ = 0), one of internal growth by retaining savings (phase II: bQ = aQ = 0, βQ,
αQ ≥ 0) and one of withdrawing (phase III: aQ ≥ 0, αQ = 0). How these possible phases
interact and in which way they affect the path of capital accumulation will be analyzed
in the next section.
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5 Taxation and Economic Growth
In this section we address the question whether the introduced tax systems affect economic
growth. For this purpose we have to endogenize the factor prize paths, that is, the interest
rate r and the wage rate w. In each period equilibrium requires that demand and supply
is balanced such that the factor markets clear. As we assumed inelastic labor supply given
by L and competitive factor markets the wage rate is determined by the marginal product
of labor: w(t) = fL(K(t), L). As financial neutrality holds for all of the described tax
systems, we can assume without loss of generality that the firm’s real capital is completely
debt financed. In a closed economy, debt then has to equal savings. Taken together
equilibrium condition Q = D = K always holds. Capital demand is in all three tax
systems implicitly determined by:
r(t) =
fK(K(t), L)− δ
PK
(65)
where variable PK represents a distortion parameter: PK = 1 holds in the case of invest-
ment neutrality (SADIT and the ACE/QBA system) and PK = 1 − α1τ
r in the case of
the GDIT. The supply side is driven by (25), (26) and (31). With dU ′(c)/dt = U ′′(c)c˙ we
obtain after a few steps
U ′′(c)
U ′(c)
c˙ =
µ˙Q + β˙Q
µQ + βQ
(66)
and
µ˙Q
µQ
= ρ− θrr (67)
Inserting (65) into (67) yields
µ˙Q
µQ
= ρ− θr
fK(K(t), L)− δ
PK
(68)
As tax revenue is rebated to the household as lump-sum transfer, the whole production
net of economic depreciation, f(K,L) − δK, is either consumed or invested. Thus we
obtain a further equation of motion
K˙ = f(K,L)− δK − c (69)
which holds in an intertemporal market equilibrium.
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5.1 Growth Effects of the SADIT and the GDIT
As has been shown above, βQ = 0 holds for all t both within the SADIT and the GDIT.
Thus, by equating (66) and (68) we obtain:
U ′′(c)
U ′(c)
c˙ = ρ−
θr
PK
[fK(K(t), L)− δ]. (70)
The dynamic system described by (69) and (70) determines paths c(t) and K(t), which
are well-defined and unique for given initial values c(0) and K(0) (Hadley and Kemp,
1973, p. 370-371). For a given initial value K(0) there is only one path, the “stable path”,
that converges to steady state (Sinn, 1987, p. 245). The stable path is the only path that
is compatible with the idea of market equilibrium (Sinn, 1987, p. 377ff).26
We restrict the analysis to the properties of the steady state, where c˙ = K˙ = 0 must hold.
From (70) we then obtain:
θr
PK
[fK(K(t), L)− δ] = ρ (71)
Observe that, as θ
r
PK
[fK(K(t), L) − δ] = θ
rr, in steady state µ˙Q = 0 holds as well. This
ensures that the transversality condition, given by (17), is satisfied. The steady state is
affected by taxation only through θ
r
PK
.
Without taxation, θ
r
PK
= 1. In the case of the SADIT, investment neutrality implies
PK = 1 and τ
r > 0. Therefore, θ
r
PK
< 1 and fK(K(t), L) − δ has to be greater than in
the absence of taxation. This implies a lower steady state level of capital. The steady
state level of the capital stock implied by the GDIT depends on the value of α1, i. e. the
rules of tax write-off. Only in the extreme case of immediate write-off, α1 = 1, we have
θr
PK
= θ
r
θr
= 1, which would imply the same steady state capital stock as with no taxation.
In Germany, as in other countries, there is α1 < 1 and the capital stock is lower than
that without taxation. Hence, the SADIT as well as the GDIT distort the steady state
allocation of capital. We obtain:
Proposition 9
The SADIT as well as the GDIT do not establish growth neutrality.
26Given K(0) and the path of r(t) the maximizing household, who regards r(t) as exogenously given,
chooses the initial value of the control variable c(0) such that (K(0), c(0)) actually lies on the stable path.
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5.2 Growth Effects of the ACE/QBA Proposal
As we have seen in Section 4.3, we can distinguish three different possible phases. We will
concentrate on the one that is relevant in the neighborhood of the steady state. As in a
steady state K˙ = 0 holds by definition, no further capital is accumulated. Consequently
all kinds of capital income are paid to the QBA, be it in the form of distributed profits
or interest income, and no capital is retained or inserted into the firm (p = bK = 0).
With Q = K we immediately conclude that Q˙ = K˙ = 0 holds in the steady state as well.
No cash flow from the QBA to the firm on the one hand and a constant QBA stock on
the other, implies positive withdrawals for consumptive usage in steady state, aQ > 0,
and thus αQ = 0. Now imagine we are below the steady state capital stock. The closer
we are to the steady state, the smaller is K˙. If we are sufficiently close, we can be sure
that there is more capital income than will be reinvested. Thus, in a neighborhood of
the steady state the same arguments as in the steady state imply αQ = 0 or equivalently
βQ = τ cU ′(c). Hence, (66) reduces to
U ′′(c)
U ′(c)
c˙ =
µ˙Q
µQ
(72)
which can be equated to (68). With θr = 1 we conclude that
U ′′(c)
U ′(c)
c˙ = ρ− (fK(K,L)− δ) (73)
holds in the neighborhood of the steady state.27 As (73) is equivalent to the the case
without taxation, the growth path in the neighborhood of the steady state is not altered
by the tax system. We obtain that r(t) = ρ must hold in steady state. Thus,
fK(K,L)− δ = ρ, (74)
which matches the steady state condition in the case without taxation. This neutrality
result implies by no means, that the whole path of capital accumulation is undistorted by
the tax system. To investigate the whole path of capital accumulation, we take a further
look at the three distinct phases labeled phase I, II and III (see Section 4.3).
27The underlying argument bears analogy to the ”new view” of dividend taxation (Sinn, 1991), though
not related to a single firm but to the aggregate economy: if enough capital is accumulated through
retained capital income, the tax on withdrawals for consumptive usage are sunk cost.
28
Proposition 10
The optimum consumption path c(t) is continuous. This also holds at the transition from
one phase to another.
Proof: See appendix.
We now turn to the final phase of an optimal path of c(t) and K(t). We obtain:
Proposition 11
Only phase III is capable of converging to an optimal steady state.
Proof: See appendix.
It should be mentioned that every path of capital accumulation, that leads to an infinite
capital stock, cannot be optimal either. As this implies limt→∞ r(t) = 0, µ
Q(t) > 0
grows at rate ρ in the long run. This, again, contradicts the transversality condition (17).
Furthermore, we derive the following result:
Proposition 12
Phase I cannot be followed immediately by phase III. Phase III cannot be followed im-
mediately by phase I.
Proof: See appendix.
To sum up, phase I can only be succeeded by phase II, and phase III can only be preceded
by phase II. In general, we cannot exclude that phase I and II respectively phase II and
III alternate. In any case the final phase of a convergent path (c(t), K(t)) has to be of
type III, that is, this phase is characterized by withdrawing resources from the QBA for
consumption.
A sufficient condition for the existence of at most one phase of each type is given by the
following proposition. Here η denotes the elasticity of marginal utility.28
Proposition 13
If
fK(K,L)− δ − ρ
f(K,L)− δK − θwfL(K,L)L
> η
fLK(K,L)
fL(K,L)
(75)
28The elasticity is defined as η := −c U ′′(c)/U ′(c).
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holds at every point c(t) = θww(t)L along the optimum consumption path, neither phase
II and III nor phase I and II alternate.
Proof: See appendix.
As Proposition 11 states, paths c(t) and K(t), that satisfy the first order conditions and
converge to a steady state, end in a final phase of type III. At least at the junction of a
possible phase II and this final phase III, equation (75) must hold.
In the case of a linear-homogeneous Cobb-Douglas production function with a and b
representing the output elasticity of capital and labor, respectively, eq. (75) reduces to:
fK(K,L)− δ − ρ > η a [(1 + τ
w b
a
)fK(K,L)− δ] (76)
If η a(1 + τw b
a
) ≥ 1, which necessarily holds for η a ≥ 1, eq. (76) does not hold for any
K below to the steady state level.29 In such a case, no phase II exists, and consequently
no phase I does. For any given initial capital stock, the economy starts (and ends) in a
unique phase III.
If η a(1 + τw b
a
) < 1, implying η a < 1, (76) is equivalent to
fK(K,L) >
δ(1− η a ) + ρ
1− η a (1 + τw b
a
)
> ρ (77)
As f satisfies the lower Inada-condition, fK(0, L) =∞, a positive capital stock Kˆ exists
for which equation (76) holds. Furthermore, assuming η to be constant, (76) holds a
fortiori for all K < Kˆ as fK(K,L) > fK(Kˆ, L). Consequently, phase II may exist and if
this is the case, equation (76) holds for all K left to the junction of phase II and phase
III. Thus phase II neither alternates with phase I nor III.
To sum up, if we assume a linear homogeneous Cobb-Douglas production function and a
constant elasticity of marginal utility, exactly one phase III and at most one phase I and
one phase II exist.
A numerical example of the convergent path for such a case is given by Figure 3. The thick
line depicts the process of consumption and capital accumulation. Parameters satisfy the
29A capital stock below the steady state level assures fK − δ > 0. Starting to the right of the steady
state necessarily leads to positive withdrawals aQ > 0, thus the economy is in phase III anyway.
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inequality in (76). Furthermore, the initial value of K, which is set to unity, is sufficiently
small to start in a phase of insertions (phase I). For the sake of comparison, the thin dashed
line depicts the respective path under the SADIT, starting at the same initial capital
stock. Here, the tax rate on interest income equals the tax rate levied on withdrawals
from the QBA in the ACE/QBA system, τ rSADIT = τ
a
ACEQBA. Assuming true economic
depreciation, α1 = 0, and a capital income tax rate of equal magnitude, the dashed line
also depicts the convergent path under the GDIT.30
6 Conclusion
We introduce an extended dynamic general equilibrium model for investigating decision
neutrality of tax systems. In doing so, we apply an alternative way of checking for finan-
cial neutrality via shadow prices in a Kuhn-Tucker framework and introduce a stylized
financial intermediary. In our framework, non-negativity constraints play also a crucial
role in analyzing the growth characteristics of different tax systems.
We apply the model and analyze recent tax reform proposals – the “Swiss ACE Dual
Income Tax” (SADIT) and the “German Dual Income Tax” (GDIT) – that accept several
exogenous restrictions, in order to be politically feasible, and, at the same time, to take
account of international tax competition. We then consider a third alternative – proposed
by Heidelberger Steuerkreis and RWI Essen –, that is based on an ACE at the company
level combined with so called “Qualified Bank Accounts” (QBA) at the private level.
The developed extended dynamic general equilibrium model is in particular required for
investigating the ACE/QBA system, but also generates interesting insights into the func-
tioning of other proposals. In all three tax systems financial neutrality prevails. The
SADIT and the ACE/QBA system also establish investment neutrality. Moreover, in
contrast to the SADIT and GDIT, the ACE/QBA system establishes additionally in-
tertemporal, respectively, growth neutrality, and thus ensures at least an undistorted level
30Accelerated tax depreciation, α1 > 0, leads to a convergent path which lies right of, and α1 < 0 to
one which lies left of the dashed line. This is in line with the findings of Sinn (1987).
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of the capital stock in and around the steady state. Therefore, in contrast to the other
considered proposals, the alternative ACE/QBA system allows for the socially optimal
growth rate in the long run.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Insert βK = γ = σ = 0 into the FOC. Combining (11) and
(12) it follows that αK = 0. Because of (13) we have µK = µQ = −µD. As this must be
true for all t, we also have µ˙Q = −µ˙D. Insertion of µ˙Q = −µ˙D into (16) together with
αK = 0 shows that (16) is equivalent to (15). Given that the other FOC are fulfilled as
well, we found a solution with βK = γ = σ = αK = 0.
✷
Proof of Proposition 2: (35) and (36) guarantee αQ = βQ = 0. Due to Lemma 1,
combining (37) and (38) produces αK = 0. It immediately follows that βK = γ: retaining
profits and inserting new equity are not discriminated against each other. Assuming
γ = σ = 0, the combination of (38) and (39) generates θaµQ = −µD. Differentiation with
respect to time t yields
−µ˙D = θaµ˙Q + θ˙aµQ (78)
Differentiating the dynamic tax factor θa according to (34), and substituting for µ˙Q and
−µ˙D according to (41) and (42), respectively, we then obtain
θaµQ(r − ρ) = θaµQ(r − ρ), (79)
which bears no contradiction. Therefore, βK = γ = σ = 0 is in line with all first-order
conditions, and the SADIT establishes financial neutrality.
✷
Proof of Proposition 3: Applying αK = βK = 0, we obtain from (37):
µK = θaµQ(1− τGα1). (80)
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Differentiation and substituting for µ˙Q/µQ according to (41) yields:
µ˙K/µK = µ˙Q/µQ − τ rr = ρ− r (81)
Rearranging (40) and substituting for µQ according to (80) we arrive at:
ρ− µ˙K/µK = (1− τGα1)
−1[θG(fK(K,L)− δ) + τ
Gr(1− α1)] (82)
Using (81) we finally obtain
(1− τGα1)r = θ
G(fK(K,L)− δ) + τ
Gr(1− α1), (83)
which is equivalent to fK(K,L)− δ = r.
✷
Proof of Proposition 4: Analogously to the SADIT, we find αQ = βQ = 0 from (46)
and (47), as well as αK = 0 and γ = βK from (48) and (49). Testing for γ = βK = σ = 0
yields θaµQ = −µD, and differentiation with respect to time θaµ˙Q = −µ˙D. Substituting
for µ˙D and µD in (53) reveals that this is in line with (52) only if θr = θG, which holds
according to the tax rates proposed by the council. Thus financial neutrality holds.31
✷
Proof of Proposition 5: Applying αK = βK = 0 to (48) we arrive at:
µK = θaµQ(1− τGα1) (84)
Differentiation with respect to t and substituting for µ˙Q/µQ according to (52) yields
µ˙K/µK = µ˙Q/µQr = ρ− θrr (85)
Then substituting for θaµQ according to (84) in (51) we obtain:
µ˙K/µK = ρ− (1− τGα1)
−1θG(fK(K,L)− δ) (86)
31Interestingly, this would also be true for any other dividend tax rate τa 6= τ r, thus it is not necessary
to set τa = τ r. However, the neutrality result requires θrr to be the rate of indexing the purchase price.
That θrr is the right discount rate is justified, as σ = 0 is in line with the first-order conditions.
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Equating (85) and (86) with using τ r = τG, we obtain:
fK(K,L)− δ = (1− τ
Gα1)r. (87)
As (87) shows, the capital cost depend on the regime of tax write-off. Only in the special
case of true economic depreciation (α1 = 0) investment neutrality prevails.
✷
Proof of Proposition 6: Again αK = 0 holds (Lemma 1). We thus have γ = βK .
Testing for γ = βK = σ = 0 and applying τa = 0 then yields µQ = −µD and consequently
µ˙Q = −µ˙D. Applying θa = 1 in combining (32) and (54) we obtain:
−µ˙D + ρµD = −µQ[θG + τGα2]r = −µ
Qθrr, (88)
which is the relevant equation of motion for µD in optimum. As µQ = −µD, this is in
line with (52), which holds both for the corporate and the non-corporate firm under the
GDIT. Thus financial neutrality also holds for non-corporate firms.
✷
Proof of Proposition 7: As equation of motion for µK in optimum we obtain:
−µ˙K + ρµK = µQ[θG(fK(K,L)− δ) + τ
Gα2r(1− α1)] (89)
= µQ[θG(fK(K,L)− δ) + (τ
G − τ r)r(1− α1)]
As in the case of a corporate firm, but with θa = 1, we can derive
µK = (1− τGα1)µ
Q (90)
¿From (89) and (90) we conclude
µ˙K/µK = ρ− (1− τGα1)
−1[θG(fK(K,L)− δ) + (τ
G − τ r)r(1− α1)] (91)
Applying (85), which also holds in the non-corporate case, yields:
θrr(1− τGα1) = θ
G(fK(K,L)− δ) + (θ
r − θG)r(1− α1) (92)
⇔ fK(K,L)− δ = (1− τ
rα1)r
Since τGcorporate = τ
r, this is exactly the same result as in the corporate case.
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✷Proof of Proposition 8: As the QBA ensures that no cash-flow is subject to personal
capital income taxation until it is withdrawn for consumption, no tax factor enters eq.
(58) to (60). Since these equations do not differ from their counterparts in the tax free
world, we obtain αK = 0 and β
K = γ = σ = 0 is in line with the first-order conditions.
Thus the financial decision of the firm is not altered by the tax system.
Furthermore, the shadow prices of bank deposits and the reduction of debt are equal:
µQ = −µD. They differ from the shadow price of real capital only by the constant factor,
for instance, µK = µQ(1−α1τ
G)). Hence, they change at the same rate: µ˙K/µK = µ˙Q/µQ.
Using (61) and (62), we thus obtain fK(K,L) − δ = r, which guarantees investment
neutrality.
✷
Proof of Proposition 10: Observe first that within phase I and III, the continuity
directly follows from the continuity of the costate variable µQ, equation (56) and equation
(57), respectively, combined with αQ = 0 and βQ = 0, respectively. During phase II
consumption equals labor income, c(t) = θwfL(K(t), L)L, as there are neither insertions
nor withdrawals (aQ = bQ = 0). Here the continuity of the state variable K(t) and the
partial derivative fL implies the continuity of c(t).
The rest of the proof is given by contradiction. Assume a point of discontinuity at the
junction point of two phases at time t, say c. Let c < c be the (without loss of generality)
left-hand limit of c(t) as t goes to t. A marginal decrease of consumption at t could be
transferred into a marginal increase of consumption in the amount of e−
∫
t
t
r(t)dt at time
t < t. This accounts for the fact that deferred consumption can be used for interest-
bearing investment. On the other hand, the (marginal) decrease in consumption at t has
to be discounted by the factor e−ρ(t−t), in order to be comparable with the increase in t.
Put together the shift of a marginal unit of consumption from t to t leads to an overall
effect in the amount of:
∆U(t) = U ′(c(t))e−
∫
t
t
r(t)dt − U ′(c)e−ρ(t−t) (93)
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In the limiting case we have
lim
t→t
∆U(t) = U ′(c)− U ′(c) > 0 (94)
as U ′′ < 0. That is, the assumed marginal shift of consumption from t to t increases
utility, which contradicts the assumption that c(t) is an optimal control. Observe that
c > c analogously leads to U ′(c) − U ′(c) < 0, i. e. a marginal deferral of consumption
would lead to an increase in utility. Thus the optimum path c(t) has to be continuous.
✷
Proof of Proposition 11: To ensure K˙ = 0,
f(K,L)− δK − c = 0 (95)
must hold in a steady state. During phase II all capital income (including economic rents,
if existent) is reinvested (c = θwwL). Phase I is characterized by bQ > 0, i. e. less than
labor income is consumed (c < θwwL). Both phases would be in line with a steady state
only if
f(K,L)− δK − θwwL ≤ 0 (96)
This implies rK ≤ 0 and, as K is positive, r ≤ 0. Because of equation (62), µQ then
grows at least at rate ρ, with U ′(c) remaining constant, as c˙ = 0 must hold as well. But
this contradicts both µQ ≤ U ′(c) from equation (57) – as bQ is nonnegative – and the
transversality condition (17).
✷
Proof of Proposition 12: As µQ is continuous this would imply a jump in U ′(c) to
compensate for the arising wedge imposed by the tax on withdrawals, τ c. This is not in
line with the continuity of c(t).
✷
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Proof of Proposition 13: During a phase of type II the optimal paths of c(t) and K(t)
are characterized by c(t) = θwfL(K(t), L)L. Denote this part of the optimum path in a
phase diagram in the (c,K) space by cII(K) (see Figure 3). Analogously define cI(K)
and cIII(K) to be the parts of the optimal path c in the (c,K) space in phases of type I
and III, respectively.
As c(t) has to be continuous, a succeeding phase III has to start at some point (c,K) in
phase II. If phases of type II and III alternate, a type III phase also ends at some point
in phase II. At such junction points phase III always reaches phase II from above, as
cI ≥ wL must hold. At a starting point, the slope of cIII(K) exceeds that of cII(K) and
vice versa at an endpoint.
Analogously, if phases of type I and II alternate, phase I reaches phase II from below, as
cI ≤ wL must hold. At an endpoint, the slope of cI(K) exceeds that of cII(K) and vice
versa at a starting point.
Obviously, those phases do not alternate if the slopes of cI(K) and cIII(K) are steeper
than the slope of cII(K) at every possible junction point. The slope of cII(K) is given by
dcII(K)
dK
= θwfLK(K,L)L (97)
Given initial values of c and K, phases I and III follow the same dynamic system. Thus
the curves cI(K) and cIII(K) exhibit identical slopes at a given point in the c-K space:
dcI(K)
dK
=
dcIII(K)
dK
=
c˙I
K˙
=
(fK(K,L)− δ − ρ)c/η
f(K,L)− δK − c
(98)
As c = θwwL = θwfL(K(t), L)L holds at possible junctions with phase II, c
I(K) and
cIII(K) are steeper than cI(K) at such points if
fK(K,L)− δ − ρ
f(K,L)− δK − θwfL(K,L)L
> η
fLK(K,L)
fL(K,L)
(99)
At least the starting point of the – necessarily existing – final phase III of a convergent
path, the inequality must hold.
✷
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B Explanation to Figure 2
Figure 2 illustrates graphically, how the non-negativity constraints potentially affect the
combination of the three different ways of financing in the optimum. The x-axes depicts
the amount of new equity inserted into the firm, bK . The y-axes shows the amount of new
debt, d. For the purpose of the figure, net investments, K˙ > 0, are exogenously given. A
remaining gap, K˙ − bK − d, is filled by retained earnings, p.
The thick border lines of the trapeze shown in the figure describe combinations of only
two financial instruments employed to finance net investments. The upper thick line with
slope −1 represents combinations of new equity and debt finance in the case of no retained
profits being used. These combinations are optimal, if γ > 0 necessarily holds.
The vertical thick line represents all combinations of d and p with bK = 0. Optimum
finance is restricted to these combinations, if the FOC require βK > 0. In the case of
σ > 0 following necessarily from the FOC, the horizontal thick line is authoritative, i. e
d = 0. In that case no equity will be employed to finance net investments.
The lower thick line with slope −1 represents the restriction aK ≥ 0, which ensures that
retained profits do not exceed the firm’s annual profits. Due to (2) this is equivalent to
the requirement of non-negative dividends aK . If the restriction is binding, i. e. αK > 0
necessarily holds, all profits are retained in optimum. For the purpose of Figure 2 we
implicitly assume net investments K˙ to exceed profits pi, as otherwise retained profits
would suffice to finance net investments.
Points in the interior of the trapeze represent combinations of all financial instruments
employed at a positive amount (bK > 0, p > 0 and d > 0 with aK > 0). If αK = βK = γ =
σ = 0 is in line with the FOC, all feasible combinations are optimal including the ones
represented by a point on the thick border lines. If, on the contrary, a tax system distorts
the financial decision, optimum financing is represented by points which necessarily lie on
a border line.
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C Is the Transversality Condition Kept?
We prove the transversality condition concerning µQ as part of the necessary conditions
of an optimum. Assume Q∗(t) to meet the other first order conditions. The two control
variables aQ ≥ 0 and bQ ≥ 0 make it possible to find admissible smooth paths Q1 and
Q2, such that Q1(t) > Q∗(t) and Q2(t) < Q∗(t), for all t > t1, for some t1 ≥ 0, and
Q1(t) = Q2(t) = Q∗(t), for all t ≤ t1. Of course, paths between Q
1 and Q2 are admissible,
too. Thus we can be sure to find a smooth function ν(t), ν(t) = 0 ∀t ≤ t1 and ν(t) > 0
∀t > t1, such that
Q(t, ξ) := Q∗(t) + ξν(t) (100)
is admissible in a neighborhood of ξ = 0 and for which Q(t, 0) := Q∗(t) holds for all t.
By construction (100) defines an admissible variation of Q(t), which neither varies K(t)
nor D(t), as these paths are not affected by aQ and bQ. Thus we found a function
ν := (ν, 0, 0) (101)
and a one-parameter family
(Q,K,D)(t, ξ) = (Q∗, K∗, D∗)(t) + ξν (102)
with X∗ denoting a path of the state variable X = Q,K,D, which meets the other first
order conditions.
We can now apply a general formulation of transversality conditions for infinite horizon
problems with free boundaries for each state variable, which states that the product of the
vector of costate variables (in present values) and the vector of any admissible variation in
the state variables, that is, any admissible ν, must vanish as time goes to infinity (Hadley
and Kemp, 1973, p. 225, 292). In our special case we thus have
lim
t→∞
(µQ, µK , µD)e−ρtν = lim
t→∞
µQe−ρtν = 0 (103)
As ν does not vanish at infinity, µQe−ρt has to.
Observe that an analogous way to prove the convergence to zero of the other costate
variables must fail, as p ≥ 0, d ≥ 0 and bK ≥ 0 together with D˙ = d and K˙ = p+ d+ bK
do not allow for admissible paths in a full neighborhood of D∗ and K∗.
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Figure 1: Basic structure of the model
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K˙ =bK p , d=0 ; 0
K˙ =bK d , p=0 ; 0
b K
d
K=K ===0
K˙
K˙
K˙ =pd ,
b K=0 ;
K0
K˙ =bK pd ,
a
K=0 ; K0
Figure 2: Restrictions on the financing of net investments
(Source: own representation at basis of Sinn (1987, p. 74))
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Figure 3: Convergent path in the ACE/QBA system in comparison to the SADIT with
α1 = 0 and τ
a
SADIT = τ
a
ACE−QBA.
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